

EXECUTIVE DOMINANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL BYPASSING: RE-EVALUATING INDONESIA'S BEBAS-AKTIF DOCTRINE AND GLOBAL SOUTH ANCHOR ROLE IN AN ERA OF MULTIALIGNMENT

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Abstract:

As of mid-2026, the international system is characterized by severe hyper-fragmentation. This volatility is exacerbated by the protracted conflict in Ukraine, Middle Eastern instability underscored by recent intelligence claims regarding Iranian nuclear capabilities, and the aggressive expansion of geo-economic trade wars, most notably the implementation of United States Section 301 reciprocal tariffs. Amidst these compounding systemic shocks, Indonesia's traditional Bebas-Aktif (Independent and Active) foreign policy doctrine remains its primary strategic asset. The doctrine provides the ideological and practical foundation for multialignment, theoretically ensuring the state's status as a proactively neutral anchor of the Global South. However, contemporary diplomatic maneuvers reveal a critical vulnerability in Indonesia's foreign policy governance. This article evaluates the rise of reactionary, "Head-of-State" diplomacy, which frequently bypasses the institutional guardrails of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu). Through qualitative analysis – examining the simultaneous dual-track push for BRICS and OECD accession, bureaucratic dysregulation in ambassadorial credentialing, and the capitulation of critical mineral sovereignty during the 2025 reciprocal tariff negotiations – this paper argues that the lack of standardized diplomatic governance reduces Bebas-Aktif from a grand strategy to ad-hoc transactionalism. To avoid the trap of becoming a strategically dependent policy-taker, and to protect vital non-traditional security assets tied to the energy transition, Indonesia must urgently re-institutionalize its foreign policy vetting protocols policy and firmly reject asymmetrical bilateral coercion.

Keywords: Indonesia Foreign Policy, *Bebas-Aktif* Foreign Policy, Global South, Multialignment, Diplomatic Governance

INTRODUCTION

The contemporary global security architecture in 2026 is undergoing a profound and unprecedented stress test. The persistence of the war in Ukraine has irreversibly hardened geopolitical fault lines across Eurasia, effectively fracturing post-Cold War security arrangements and disrupting global supply chains (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2026). Simultaneously, the global landscape has been rocked by recent intelligence claims regarding Iranian nuclear weapon capabilities which was later cited by the president of Indonesia (Djamin et al., 2026). This development has destabilized global energy markets, invoked the threat of secondary sanctions, and triggered escalating, multi-front conflicts in the Middle East.



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Beyond traditional kinetic warfare and nuclear proliferation, the global economic order has been severely disrupted by aggressive geo-economic statecraft. The most prominent example is the weaponization of market access through the United States' Section 301 reciprocal tariffs under the current administration, a maneuver that systematically forces middle powers into zero-sum economic capitulations (USTR, 2026; Childress et al., 2026). In this era of hyper-fragmentation, state survival depends heavily on the capacity to navigate competing hegemonic demands without surrendering sovereign autonomy (Juned & Sutiono, 2024).

To situate this analysis within the broader scope of structural economic and public policy, it is essential to recognize that foreign policy governance does not operate in a vacuum. The institutional integrity of Indonesia's multialignment strategy—specifically its simultaneous engagements with the OECD and BRICS—dictates the macroeconomic stability, international regulatory alignment, and cross-border frameworks essential for domestic economic resilience. Consequently, the erosion of predictable diplomatic governance and the capitulation of sovereign economic policies do not merely affect grand strategy; they cascade directly into the domestic economic environment, fundamentally shaping the regulatory stability required for national economic sectors, cross-border mobility, and international policy development.

For Indonesia, navigating this treacherous geopolitical environment relies entirely on its foundational foreign policy doctrine of Bebas-Aktif (Independent and Active). First articulated by the nation's founding father and first Vice President, Mohammad Hatta (1953), the principle was designed to ensure that Indonesia would not become a passive pawn in great power competition. Today, this doctrine is not merely a historical relic; it is an acute, pragmatic necessity. It theoretically guarantees Indonesia's strategic autonomy, allowing Jakarta to engage with multiple geopolitical poles without being legally or morally bound to any single hegemonic bloc (Anwar, 1997; Juned & Sutiono, 2024; Leifer, 1983). This consistency serves as the core "insurance" that Indonesia will act as a proactively neutral middle power and a reliable, stabilizing anchor of the Global South (Karim, 2018; Laksmana, 2021).

However, doctrinal consistency demands rigid institutional discipline. Current diplomatic operations reveal a troubling shift toward reactionary, personalized diplomacy. When Indonesia's geopolitical actions appear unvetted and highly personalized by the Head of State, the Bebas-Aktif doctrine is degraded from a grand strategy of principled non-alignment into a transactional tool of convenience. This paper argues that to maintain its credibility as an unshakeable Global South anchor—rather than an actor vulnerable to asymmetric external pressure eager to appease competing great powers—Indonesia must comprehensively institutionalize its foreign policy governance, curb reactionary diplomacy, and aggressively protect its non-traditional security (NTS) assets, specifically its critical mineral supply chains. The article proceeds by establishing a rigorous theoretical framework based on hedging and neo-classical realism, tracing the institutional evolution of Indonesia's diplomacy, and analyzing three critical contemporary case studies from 2025-2026.

This study anchors its theoretical framework in Neoclassical Realism, which posits that systemic pressures are filtered through domestic intervening variables—specifically state-society relations, elite cohesion, and political economy—before translating into foreign policy outputs. This framework bridges the gap between structural imperatives and granular policy shifts, allowing for an analysis of how internal vulnerabilities mediate Indonesia's diplomatic maneuvering. To investigate these dynamics, the research employs a qualitative comparative case study design, aiming to process-trace the causal link between systemic shocks and divergent state responses. Methodologically, this approach enables a nuanced exploration of complex, non-quantifiable



political phenomena, though it is subject to inherent limitations. These include the extreme fluidity of the current geopolitical landscape, which necessitates a reliance on policy trajectories and formal discourse up to early 2026, and the potential for interpretation bias when inferring internal elite factionalism from external outputs. Consequently, the study utilizes methodological triangulation to ensure analytical rigor and mitigate the impact of aspirational state rhetoric.

While existing scholarship extensively analyzes Indonesia's multialignment strategy through structural realist frameworks, this study introduces specific novelty by applying a neoclassical realist lens to the domestic execution of these policies. The research gap addressed here is the under-examined bureaucratic friction between executive-led 'reactionary diplomacy' and the institutional vetting mechanisms of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu). This manuscript argues that systemic pressures are currently bypassing domestic institutional filters, leading to ad-hoc transactionalism.

Furthermore, this study analytically operationalizes the concept of a 'Global South anchor.' Rather than a static geopolitical identity, an 'anchor' role is defined here as a state's capacity to maintain strategic autonomy and institutional predictability amidst systemic fragmentation. In this analysis, the anchor role is measured through three observable empirical indicators. First, The presence or absence of codified strategic boundaries (red lines) when simultaneously pursuing integration into competing economic blocs (e.g., the OECD and BRICS). Second, the standardization of bureaucratic governance, observable through standardized timelines for ambassadorial credentialing and inter-agency vetting of crisis responses. Third, the state's ability to defend Non-Traditional Security (NTS) assets, measured by the consistency of its domestic industrial policies (such as critical mineral export controls) when subjected to bilateral trade pressures like the US Section 301 tariffs.

LITERATURE REVIEW

To fully comprehend the current trajectory of Indonesian foreign policy, it is necessary to deploy a multi-layered theoretical framework that intersects neo-classical realism, the concept of hedging, and the modern paradigms of non-traditional security (NTS). Neo-classical realism posits that a state's foreign policy is shaped by a complex interplay between systemic external factors – such as the international structure, anarchy, and great power rivalries – and unit-level domestic variables, including domestic politics, leader perceptions, state-society relations, and institutional capacity. While structural realists argue that the international system unilaterally dictates state behavior, neo-classical realists maintain that systemic pressures must be filtered through domestic institutions. In the context of Indonesia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu) has historically served as the primary bureaucratic filter for these systemic pressures, translating international volatility into calculated diplomatic strategy (Rüland, 2017).

However, when the executive branch dominates foreign policy formulation – bypassing the institutional filter of Kemlu – the resulting policies often reflect the immediate political calculations, domestic economic pressures, or idiosyncrasies of the Head of State rather than long-term strategic state interests (Laksmiana, 2021; Lampton, 2012). The erosion of institutional filtering leads to "reactionary diplomacy," characterized by spontaneous international commitments that frequently contradict established doctrinal boundaries.

Furthermore, under immense systemic pressures, middle powers like Indonesia frequently employ "hedging." Kuik (2022) defines hedging as a strategic behavior characterized by a mix of contradictory policies designed to avoid taking sides while maximizing economic and security



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benefits. Hedging allows a state to maintain equidistance from rival powers, ensuring that it is neither fully aligned nor entirely adversarial with any single hegemon (Goh, 2008). Indonesia's historical approach to hedging has been framed as a "pragmatic equidistance" (Laksmana, 2020).

In the contemporary context, scholars observe that Indonesia is pushing the boundaries of traditional hedging by adopting a strategy of "multialignment," wherein the state actively seeks simultaneous integration into competing international frameworks (Juned et.al., 2025). This multialignment requires a highly delicate balancing act. While it offers economic diversification and strategic insurance, it simultaneously exposes the state to the risk of diplomatic overreach if these multiple alignments are not governed by a coherent, standardized institutional framework. Without institutional guardrails, multialignment easily devolves into diplomatic contradiction, severely undermining the state's credibility as a neutral actor.

By synthesizing the structural imperatives of Neoclassical Realism with the strategic behaviors of hedging and multialignment, this framework provides a robust lens to analyze the current degradation of Indonesia's foreign policy governance. While systemic volatility necessitates agile engagement, the literature suggests that without the institutional filtering of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu), Indonesia's multialignment strategy risks transitioning from a calculated "pragmatic equidistance" to reactionary, ad-hoc transactionalism. This study posits that the divergence between Indonesia's intended neutral anchor role and its recent contradictory diplomatic maneuvers — such as the simultaneous, unvetted push for competing blocs — is not merely a reaction to external pressure, but a failure of domestic institutional discipline. Consequently, the research evaluates whether the erosion of these bureaucratic guardrails renders the Bebas-Aktif doctrine unsustainable in the face of intensified geopolitical competition, ultimately examining how state-society relations and executive-led decision-making undermine the nation's strategic autonomy.

METHODS

This study employs a qualitative descriptive-analytical research design utilizing a multiple case study approach (Creswell & Poth, 2018). Qualitative methodology is particularly suited for this research as it allows for an in-depth exploration of the complex, unit-level bureaucratic dynamics and executive decision-making processes that shape Indonesia's contemporary foreign policy. By adopting a case study approach as outlined by Yin (2018), this article effectively isolates specific, contemporary diplomatic maneuvers to evaluate the broader structural shifts in Indonesia's foreign policy governance under the umbrella of the Bebas-Aktif doctrine.

The research relies entirely on secondary data gathered through extensive document analysis and library research. The data collection focuses on the period between late 2024 and mid-2026, capturing the diplomatic transition and subsequent policy executions of the current administration. The data corpus is triangulated from three primary categories of secondary sources to ensure validity and mitigate bias: Official government documents and statements; institutional and think-tank reports; academic literature and peer-reviewed journals.

Data analysis was conducted using a thematic analysis framework tailored for political science research. The analytical process followed three interactive phases: data condensation, data display, and conclusion drawing/verification (Miles et al., 2014). First, the collected documents were coded and condensed into three primary empirical themes corresponding to the study's case studies: institutional multialignment (the BRICS and OECD accession bids); bureaucratic dysregulation (ambassadorial credentialing and ad-hoc diplomacy); and non-traditional security and economic coercion (the Section 301 tariffs and critical mineral policies). Second, the condensed



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data was displayed and analyzed through the theoretical lens of neo-classical realism. This step involved tracing how systemic pressures (e.g., hyper-fragmentation and US-China trade wars) were filtered—or failed to be filtered by Indonesia's domestic institutions (Kemlu). Finally, conclusions were drawn by synthesizing the empirical findings to evaluate the overall health of the Bebas-Aktif doctrine and to formulate actionable policy recommendations for re-institutionalizing foreign policy governance.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The Historical and Institutional Bedrock of *Bebas-Aktif*

The imperative for standardized foreign policy governance is deeply rooted in Indonesia's diplomatic history. The *Bebas-Aktif* principle was born out of the Cold War, functioning as a survival mechanism against the bipolar pressures of the United States and the Soviet Union. Mohammad Hatta (1953) explicitly defined the doctrine not as a passive, isolationist neutralism, but as an active pursuit of global peace and domestic economic development through independent judgment.

During the New Order era under Suharto, this principle was institutionalized to foster regional stability and attract foreign direct investment. The establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was driven largely by Indonesia's desire to insulate the region from great power proxy conflicts, leveraging *Bebas-Aktif* to project a benign, non-threatening regional leadership (Anwar, 1997; Emmers, 2014). Laksmana (2021) noted that Indonesia views its foreign policy as a reflection of its national resilience; external autonomy is inextricably linked to internal stability and institutional coherence.

Throughout the Reformasi (post-1998) period, democratization forced Indonesia to project its Islamic and democratic identity onto the global stage (Sukma, 1999; Sukma, 2003). Kemlu emerged as a highly professionalized bureaucracy responsible for maintaining the ideological purity of *Bebas-Aktif* amidst a rapidly democratizing society (Anwar, 2018). However, the administration of Joko Widodo (2014-2024) introduced a heavily developmentalist and pragmatic tilt to foreign policy, often prioritizing short-term infrastructure investments and raw material diplomacy over normative diplomatic leadership (Bland, 2020).

The subsequent administration in 2024-2026 has further personalized diplomacy. With a highly traveled Head of State, the current executive branch has sought a more assertive global role, frequently delivering international addresses and proposing global initiatives without the traditional, extensive vetting by Kemlu's epistemic community. This historical trajectory illustrates a dangerous divergence: as the global system has become exponentially more complex and fragmented, Indonesia's foreign policy formulation has simultaneously become less institutionalized and more reliant on executive spontaneity.

The Dual-Track Conundrum: BRICS, the OECD, the BoP and the "Yes-Man" Trap

Indonesia's contemporary ambition to join both the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the Board of Peace (BoP) / BRICS economic bloc vividly illustrates the profound tension between strategic multialignment and reactionary overreach. Indonesia's pursuit of OECD accession is viewed domestically as a crucial step toward achieving the "Golden Indonesia 2045" vision, a developmental benchmark designed to help the nation escape the middle-income trap through structural reforms, open trade, and market liberalization. However, OECD



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accession carries severe normative and economic conditionalities. The OECD explicitly promotes policies that run counter to Indonesia's heavily protectionist industrial strategies, particularly its local content requirements and raw material export bans, which are central to its hilirisasi (downstreaming) policies (Rahmadillah, 2025). Furthermore, aligning deeply with an organization heavily dominated by Western powers and normative frameworks carries the geopolitical risk of appearing to "pick a side" in the ongoing great power competition, potentially alienating non-Western partners.

Conversely, in a move widely interpreted as an attempt to balance the OECD bid and assert its Global South leadership, Indonesia simultaneously pursued and secured integration into the BRICS framework in 2025. The rationale behind joining BRICS aligns with the administration's goal of fostering deeper relationships with emerging economies, securing non-Western economic opportunities, exploring de-dollarized trade mechanisms, and securing infrastructure investment from China and India.

However, this dual-track approach has generated massive institutional friction. The simultaneous pursuit of both blocs represents the ultimate contemporary test of Bebas-Aktif. While Indonesia utilizes its non-aligned principle as a justification for joining both, BRICS membership inherently damages Indonesia's standing among Western partners due to perceptions of aligning with revisionist powers, particularly in the shadow of the ongoing Ukraine war and the escalating tensions in the Middle East.

The core vulnerability is not the act of hedging itself; hedging is a standard survival tactic for middle powers (Kuik, 2022). The vulnerability lies in the lack of a standardized, institutionalized roadmap governing these accessions. Pursuing both memberships simultaneously without articulating clear, non-negotiable red lines risks portraying Indonesia not as a principled, bridging power, but as a geopolitical "yes-man" eager to appease divergent global camps to extract short-term economic concessions.

A genuine anchor of the Global South must possess the institutional fortitude to define boundaries and enforce strategic limits. By attempting to placate all blocs without a cohesive grand strategy, executive-driven diplomacy signals a lack of strategic conviction. Consistency is absolutely required to prove that Indonesia is a stabilizing force, a nation that operates on constitutional mandates, portraying Indonesia not as a principled, bridging power, but as a strategically dependent actor forced to appease divergent global camps to extract short-term economic concessions. The Global South requires an anchor that is stable, predictable, and immune to the whims of great power coercion.

Reactionary Diplomacy and Bureaucratic Dysregulation

The current executive administration has exhibited a distinct preference for high-profile, personalized international engagements. While this reflects a valid desire for a greater global role, experts note that these global ambitions often lack coherent foreign policy strategy and deep institutional thought leadership.

A glaring precedent for this reactionary diplomacy occurred during the 2023 Shangri-La Dialogue, where a controversial "peace plan" for the Ukraine conflict was proposed spontaneously by the then-defense minister (now the current executive authority). This proposal, which included a ceasefire and a demilitarized zone that heavily favored the facts on the ground established by the aggressor, was presented without prior, rigorous consultation with Kemlu. Unsurprisingly, it



caused widespread diplomatic confusion and was immediately rejected by Ukraine and its Western allies (Djamin et al., 2026).

This instance exemplifies the perils of reactionary diplomacy. When a leader makes spontaneous geopolitical commitments or issues reactive statements on highly volatile global conflicts – such as the 2026 intelligence claims regarding Iran's nuclear capabilities – without inter-agency synchronization, it projects an image of profound internal incoherence (Laksmana, 2020). For foreign policy ideas to flourish and command respect on the global stage, they must be built, vetted, and polished by the epistemic community of diplomats and scholars at Kemlu, rather than relying solely on the personal instincts of a sitting president. Bypassing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs strips Indonesia of its calculated diplomatic weight, transforming the nation into an unpredictable actor.

Furthermore, the personalization of foreign policy has occasionally contributed to administrative bottlenecks. By mid-2026, concerns emerged regarding the delayed status of ambassadorial credentials. As highlighted by former Deputy Foreign Minister Dino Patti Djalal, 17 foreign envoys—including representatives from ASEAN states—waited between six to eight months to formally present their letters of credence to the President, leaving them unable to officially commence their duties. Djalal critically contrasted this delay with standard diplomatic protocols, noting that Indonesian ambassadors deployed abroad typically present their credentials to host countries swiftly to avoid protracted waiting periods. In response, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu) dismissed concerns of diplomatic friction; Foreign Minister Sugiono explained that the arrivals occurred in phases since late 2025, describing the scheduling as a "gradual process," and emphasized that informal bilateral cooperation remained fully intact in the interim (Hanung & Tanamal, 2026; Shofa, 2026). Nevertheless, from an institutional perspective, extended administrative bottlenecks—even if mitigated by informal channels—risk creating negative impressions among friendly nations. To effectively serve as an active mediator in global conflicts, Indonesia requires open, highly efficient channels of communication; extended delays risk weakening the nation's reputation as a predictably functioning diplomatic partner.

Such friction fundamentally undermines the "Active" (Aktif) pillar of Indonesia's foreign policy. To serve as an active mediator in global conflicts, Indonesia requires open, efficient, and highly reliable channels of communication with all nations (Weatherbee, 2013). When the institutional machinery of Kemlu is marginalized by executive spontaneity and administrative bottlenecks, the resultant dysregulation severely damages Indonesia's reputation as a mature, predictable diplomatic partner.

Economic Coercion, Trade Wars, and NTS Sovereignty

"The lack of standardized foreign policy governance directly compromises Indonesia's Non-Traditional Security (NTS) interests, particularly regarding resource sovereignty and the clean energy transition. The most severe consequence of unvetted, reactionary diplomacy occurred during the 2025 bilateral trade negotiations with the United States. Faced with the imminent threat of punitive tariffs resulting from a U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Section 301 investigation into manufacturing overcapacity and forced labor allegations (Childress et al., 2026), Indonesian executive negotiators engaged in ad-hoc bilateral talks to mitigate the market access restrictions. During these separate bilateral tariff negotiations, the executive branch yielded critical sovereign



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ground by relaxing domestic hilirisasi (downstreaming) export restrictions on critical minerals in exchange for tariff relief."

This capitulation directly undermines Indonesia's long-term industrialization strategy. As noted by Rahmadillah (2025), transitioning from mere mineral extraction to full-scale industrialization (such as domestic EV battery manufacturing) is an existential economic imperative for Indonesia. Yielding to bilateral tariff pressure demonstrates to global markets that Indonesia's industrial policies are pliable under duress, severely weakening its negotiating leverage with other economic blocs like China and the EU.

When foreign policy is dictated by short-term reactionary concessions rather than institutional strategy, Indonesia's green investment climate is destabilized. International stakeholders, such as those financing the Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) and foreign investors in renewable manufacturing, require regulatory consistency and ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) compliance. Ad-hoc foreign policy shifts regarding critical mineral exports erode investor confidence, threatening the projected multi-billion-dollar GDP additions and job creation tied to the renewable energy supply chain.

This sovereign control was deeply compromised during the escalating trade wars of the mid-2020s. Faced with the immediate threat of aggressive United States Section 301 tariffs – ostensibly targeting manufacturing overcapacity and forced labor allegations in the Southeast Asian region – Indonesian executive negotiators engaged in frantic bilateral discussions. Driven by the fear of losing access to the US market, these ad-hoc negotiations bypassed standard, long-term diplomatic defense protocols and ultimately yielded vital sovereign ground.

This capitulation represents a chaotic of foreign policy governance. By surrendering export controls under bilateral duress to avoid the harshest immediate impacts of the Section 301 tariffs, the executive branch unilaterally undermined a decade of carefully constructed industrial and environmental policy. This action clearly demonstrated to the global community that Indonesia's economic sovereignty and its NTS policies are pliable when subjected to intense unilateral pressure.

Such vulnerability strips Indonesia of its negotiating leverage against other economic behemoths, such as China and the European Union. If The US can coerce Indonesia into abandoning its critical mineral sovereignty, China and the EU will inevitably employ similar tactics. Consequently, this reactionary capitulation cripples Indonesia's ambition to become an independent, rule-shaping manufacturing hub for green technologies. When foreign policy is dictated by short-term bilateral trade panic rather than long-term, institutionalized NTS strategy, the very essence of the Bebas-Aktif doctrine is violated.

CONCLUSION

In a fragmented global order defined by protracted armed conflicts across Eurasia, the looming specter of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, devastating trade wars, and the overt weaponization of economic dependencies, Indonesia cannot afford a foreign policy characterized by freestyle, reactionary diplomacy. The Bebas-Aktif doctrine remains a conceptually brilliant and historically proven framework for securing strategic autonomy, but its contemporary application has been severely compromised by a glaring lack of institutional governance.

By bypassing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, entertaining contradictory dual-track bloc accessions without a clear strategic narrative, and capitulating to US geo-economic coercion regarding its most vital critical minerals, the state risks alienating its traditional Global South allies



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and forfeiting its non-traditional security. The era of personalized, ad-hoc diplomacy has reached its potential limit of utility.

To successfully navigate the treacherous geopolitical waters of 2026 and beyond, Indonesia must aggressively re-institutionalize its foreign policy apparatus. By empowering Kemlu as the sole authority, defending its critical mineral sovereignty through legislative action, and operating as a principled, predictable middle power, Indonesia can transform its Bebas-Aktif philosophy from a historical slogan into a formidable, modern shield. Only through strict, standardized diplomatic governance can Indonesia definitively prove that it is a true, unshakeable anchor of the Global South—a sovereign state that speaks with one coherent voice, unequivocally refuses to be a geopolitical dependent, and actively secures its own prosperous, sustainable future in a deeply divided world.

To transition from these empirical findings to structural solutions, this study proposes four institutionally feasible policy reforms designed to standardize Indonesia's diplomatic governance. First, to mitigate the risks of unvetted executive signaling, the government should formalize an inter-ministerial Foreign Policy Review Board (FPRB) anchored by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Kemlu). As a legally viable mechanism, this advisory body could be established via a Presidential Regulation, aligning seamlessly with Kemlu's existing coordinative mandate under Law No. 37 of 1999 on Foreign Relations. Second, to secure Non-Traditional Security (NTS) interests against asymmetric economic coercion, the legislature should evaluate the creation of a National Critical Mineral Sovereignty Act. This proposed statutory framework would legally classify vital green transition minerals as strategic assets, equipping negotiators with a codified institutional defense against bilateral tariff pressures. Third, to ensure multialignment remains strategically coherent, the government should publish a comprehensive White Paper that explicitly defines the analytical boundaries and strategic parameters of its simultaneous engagements with varying economic blocs, such as the OECD and BRICS. Finally, to maintain administrative predictability, the government must resolve internal bureaucratic bottlenecks by enforcing standardized statutory timelines for the processing of ambassadorial credentials. By leveraging existing legal and administrative frameworks to implement these reforms, Indonesia can transition its Bebas-Aktif doctrine from an ad-hoc executive posture into a highly institutionalized strategy, thereby securing its strategic autonomy and operational predictability as an anchor of the Global South

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